The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision sets the o¢ cial con…dence level at which a bank is supposed to absorb annual losses at 99:9%. However, due to an inconsistency between the notion of expected losses in the Vasicek model, on the one hand, and the practice of Basel regulation, on the other hand, actual con…dence levels are likely to be lower. This paper calculates the minimal con…dence levels which correspond to a worst case scenario in which a Basel-regulated bank holds capital against unexpected losses only. I argue that the probability of a bank failure is signi…cantly higher than the o¢ cial 0:1% if, …rstly, the bank holds risky loans and if, secondly, the bank was previously a¤ected by substantial write-o¤s.
INTRODUCTION
The Basel I accord required banks to hold capital such that the capital to risk-weighted asset ratio was not below 8%. A theoretical drawback of this ad hoc approach to capital regulation was the seeming arbitrariness of the 8% ratio as well as of the prescribed risk-weights. The internal ratings based (=IRB) approach of the Basel II and III accord attempts to address this drawback by introducing the Value-at-Risk (=VaR) criterion as its theoretical foundation for capital regulation. Under the VaR criterion the regulator chooses a con…dence level which supposedly stands for the bank's survival probability over the next year.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (=BCBS) sets the con…dence level at a remarkably high 99:9%. In other words: If the default risk was independent accross banks, a Basel-regulated banking system would result (in average) in one annual bank failure per one thousand banks. Similarly, if a bank's default risk was independent across time, this bank would fail (in average) once per one thousand years. Consequently, if we are exclusively concerned with credit risk-thereby abstracting from any further operational and market risks-the Basel regulatory approach suggests that widespread bank failures will not be a problem in our lifetimes.
In the present paper I adopt the regulatory VaR approach of the BCBS. However, in contrast to the o¢ cial line of argument by the BCBS, I demonstrate that the actual con…dence level of a Basel-regulated bank might be much lower than the o¢ cial 99:9%. In particular, I argue that an inconsistency in the practice of Basel capital regulation gives rise to a worst case scenario in which a Basel-regulated bank only holds capital against unexpected but not against expected losses. In order to evaluate the actual con…dence levels, I am going to calculate the probabilities of bank failures that correspond to this worst case scenario. Three main insights arise from my analysis:
1. The regulatory VaR approach only works if every single bank loan is fully covered against unexpected plus expected losses by the capital charge that correspond to the VaR at the speci…ed con…dence level.
Even if the Basel
VaR approach is the correct model for a bank's VaR, the o¢ cial 99:9% con…dence level of the Basel capital regulation might give us a false sense of security because the Basel regulatory capital only covers against unexpected but not against expected losses.
THE ISSUE UNDER CONSIDERATION
This section provides a more technical introduction to the regulatory VaR approach. Let the continuous random variable X B denote the bank's annual percentage portfolio pro…t (expressed as decimals) so that X = 1 stands for the worst possible case according to which the bank will have lost 100% of its portfolio value after one year.
1 Fix a con…dence level 1 q and determine the VaR of X B at q as the negative of the q-th quantile of X B ,
i.e.,
with F denoting the cumulative distribution function (=cdf) of X. If the bank holds the capital amount (1) as percentage of its portfolio value, it can absorb all annual losses up to the amount F 1 (q) so that the bank will survive with probability 1 q for another year. Suppose that the regulator possesses the correct model for (1) . Then it remains for him to choose the bank's survival probability 1 q that is optimal from his perspective and to force the bank to hold (1) as percentage of its total exposure at default. In order to come up with a parsimonious analytical expression for (1), the BCBS applies the Vasicek model.
2;3 Consider the pro…t X of a bucket portfolio, i.e., a portfolio that consists of a large number of loans to obligors such that (i) each obligor cannot repay the loan after one year with probability (def ault) whereby (ii) each loan's percentage loss-given-default is identically given as (expressed as decimals)
LGD and (iii) each loan's total exposure at default is identically given as EAD. Furthermore, suppose that the correlation coe¢ cient between any two obligors'asset values is given as . Under the assumptions of the Vasicek model, we then obtain the following analytical expression of (1) for the VaR of a bucket portfolio (see the subsequent section for a detailed discussion):
where denotes the cdf of the standard normal distribution. The Vasicek-formula (2) is a special case of the single-factor models investigated in Schoenbucher 4 and Gordy 5 for which the portfolio invariance principle holds. According to this principle, an added or withdrawn capital-charge of (2) for any loan added or withdrawn will keep the overall bucket portfolio covered at an 1 q con…dence level. As a consequence, the overall bucket portfolio will survive at the 1 q con…dence level if every single loan within the bucket is charged at V aR q (X) percent of its EAD.
Going beyond the Vasicek model, the Basel accord stipulates that the correlation coe¢ cient in the Vasicek-formula (2) can be described as a function in the obligors' default probability such that is exponentially decreasing in (def ault) with values in the interval (0:12; 0:24) for loans to corporate and sovereign obligors and, since Basel III, in the interval (0:15; 0:3) for loans to …nancial obligors. The Basel accord also stipulates that either the overall bank portfolio is already given as some bucket portfolio or it consists of several bucket portfolios such that the VaRs of all X at q add up to the VaR of X B at q. That is, the Basel accord presumes that a capital charge of V aR q (X)
for each bucket portfolio will add up to the capital V aR q X B necessary for covering the whole bank at an 1 q con…dence level. Under the above (strong) assumptions, the Basel VaR approach comes thus up with a parsimonious analytical formula for the capital charge of any given bank loan's EAD that only depends on (i) the obligor's default probability and (ii) the obligor's loss-given-default. In a …nal step, the BCBS sets the con…dence level at 99:9%. However, at this point some inconsistency between the Vasicek model and the practice of Basel capital regulation arises. Instead of requiring the capital charge V aR 0:001 (X), which would cover for losses at the 99:9% con…dence level, the Basel accord splits up V aR 0:001 (X) into expected versus unexpected losses. On the one hand, the Basel accord "requires" regulatory capital, denoted K Basel , to be held against unexpected losses only. However, on the other hand, the Basel accord "expects" banks to somehow hold capital against expected losses. In practice these expected losses are supposedly covered by write-downs and impairments for unhealthy loans. However, this practice is in contrast to the notion of expected losses in the Vasicek model which refers to the average losses of currently healthy loans that will occur in one year's time. Due to this inconsistency in the Basel capital regulation, the actual amount of capital held by a Basel-regulated bank can be expected to fall somewhere into the interval
whereby
because the percentage of expected losses coincides under the Vasicek model with each obligor's (unconditional) probability of default times the loss-given default. The interval of possible Basel capital levels (3) corresponds to the following interval of possible con…dence levels
such that the Basel-regulated bank absorbs losses at the minimal con…dence level 1 q whenever it only holds capital K Basel . Formally, the value of q is pinned down by the
As this paper's main contribution, I calculate the values of the minimal con…dence levels 1 q . In contrast to the maximal con…dence level, which is …xed at 0:999 for all probabilities of default, the minimal con…dence level 1 q is a strictly decreasing function in the obligor's default probability. Our numerical results show that the minimal con…dence levels become signi…cantly smaller than the 99:9% when the probability of an obligor's default increases. For example, whereas at 0:2 probability of default the minimal capital K Basel can still absorb losses at an 95:6% con…dence level, it can only absorb losses at an 83:6% con…dence level when the probability of default rises to 0:3, and at an 54% con…dence level when the probability of default rises to 0:4.
THE BASEL VaR APPROACH
Throughout this paper I assume that the Basel approach towards the speci…cation of the VaR of a bank portfolio (1) is indeed the correct one; or at least su¢ ciently close to reality. Nevertheless, the reader should be aware that the Basel VaR approach is based on the following (strong) assumptions:
Whether a bank loan will be repaid after one year by any given obligor or not, is completely determined by the obligor's value process formally described as Geometric Brownian motion.
2. There exist bucket portfolios which contain a large number of (su¢ ciently …ne-grained) obligors whose value processes are equicorrelated so that there exists a single systemic risk-factor per bucket portfolio.
3. The correlation coe¢ cients for the loans within any given bucket portfolio are correctly re ‡ected by the Basel formula.
4. The loss-given-default of any obligor is the same for all values of the systemic factor.
5. Either a bank is already given as a single bucket portfolio or the absolute VaRs of the bank's bucket portfolios are supposed to be additive.
Because the correct understanding of the Basel VaR approach is central to this paper, the remainder of this Section sketches in some detail the reasoning behind this approach. For expositional convenience, I thereby restrict attention to the simple case of bucket portfolios which contain loans with identical EAD and LGD. For a technically more general analysis of single-factor conditionally independent models, I would like to refer the reader to Schoenbucher 4 , Vasicek 2;3 , Gordy 5 , and Thomas and Wang 7 .
The obligor' s asset value process
Suppose that the bank's assets are characterized as loans to obligors. Whether any given obligor pays back this loan in period t, depends on whether this obligor will have defaulted in t or not. Such a default occurs if and only if the obligor's time t absolute asset value falls below some threshold K. Following Vasicek, the Basel accord thereby assumes that an obligor' asset value process is given as geometric Brownian motion. More speci…cally, let us identify the value process of an obligor's asset as
with W denoting a Wiener process. By an application of Itô's formula-and according integration-it can easily be shown 8 that the log value of the obligor's asset at period t is given as log
Furthermore, recall that a Wiener process satis…es
Consequently, we can equivalently rewrite (9) as
has a standard normal distribution. To characterize the default probability of the obligor at time t observe that
such that
where denotes the cdf of the standard normal distribution.
It is important to observe that the above approach de…nes an obligor's default as an event that happens exactly at time t, i.e., when the asset value A (t) is compared to the threshold K, and not at any time between 0 and t as it is implicitly assumed by the practice of Basel capital regulation with respect to expected losses. In what follows, we simply write V for the asset value V (t) such that t is given as one year which is the relevant time-span for the Basel regulation.
The large Bucket portfolio
Consider n obligors whose asset value processes are described by (7) . We collect the n loans to these obligors within a bucket portfolio if the following assumptions are satis…ed. First, there exists a common correlation coe¢ cient between the log asset values of any two obligors i and j, i; j f2 1; :::; ng; that is, the obligors'asset values are equicorrelated. Second, all obligors are characterized by an identical LGD and EAD. Whereas the equicorrelation assumption is crucial to the Vasicek model, the identical LGD and EAD assumption is merely for expositional convenience and can be easily generalized.
3;5
The jointly standard normal and equicorrelated asset-values can be decomposed for each obligor i into
whereby Y and " i , i 2 f1; :::; ng, are independent and identically standard normal distributed. Y is interpreted as the systemic factor common to all obligors in the bucket portfolio whereas " i is a factor idiosyncratic to obligor i. Conditioning the event of default of obligor i on the systemic factor Y , we obtain
Substituting
in (24) gives us the so-called Vasicek formula (cf. Equation (3) 
De…ne the systemic loss L Y = Y and equivalently rewrite (26) as follows
Conditional on the systemic loss L Y = l Y the standardized log values V i of all assets i 2 f1; :::; ng in the bucket are i.i.d.. The law of large numbers therefore implies that (def ault j L Y = l Y ) will coincide (almost surely) with the proportion of loans in a given bucket which default under L Y = l Y if the number of obligors n in the bucket gets large. Let X denote the percentage pro…t of the bucket portfolio after one year and observe that for large n the loss of the bucket portfolio is thus given as the random variable
is given by (27).
Con…dence levels for systemic losses versus portfolio losses
Fix a con…dence level 1 q for the systemic factor and observe that we have for the Vasicek model
The following proposition establishes that covering the bucket portfolio against systemic losses at an 1 q con…dence level is equivalent to covering the bucket portfolio against portfolio losses at an 1 q con…dence level.
Proposition. Consider a large bucket portfolio with random percentage pro…t X. For the Vasicek model it holds that
Proof: Rewrite the portfolio losses as a function of systemic losses
and observe that g ( ) is strictly increasing in l Y , i.e.,
Consequently,
Let
and observe that
,
This proves
Finally, observe that we have for the standard normally distributed systemic factor The above proposition for the Vasicek model can be regarded as a special case of Gordy's Proposition 4 which considers a more general notion of bucket portfolios than we do.
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Obligor correlation
The VaR of the bucket portfolio, given by (31), has been exclusively derived by an application of the Vasicek model for which the correlation coe¢ cient is an exogenous parameter. To come up with a parsimonious formula for regulatory capital charges, the Basel VaR approach endogenizes by describing it as an exponential function in the probability of default (def ault). More speci…cally, the Basel II accord de…nes
= 0:12 (1 exp ( 50 (def ault))) + 0:24 exp ( 50 (def ault)) . Figure 1 shows that (49) quickly decreases from its least upper bound at 0:24 to its greatest lower bound at 0:12.
The realistic appeal of the one-size-…ts-it all formula (49) is questionable. For example, in the aftermath of the …nancial crisis the BCBS already observes: "Large …nancial institutions were more interconnected than currently re‡ected in the capital framework [i.e., Basel II, the author]. As a result, when markets entered the downturn, banks'counterparty exposure to other …nancial …rms also increased. The evidence suggests that the asset values of …nancial …rms are, on a relative basis, more correlated than those of non…nancial …rms."(BCBS 2009, p. 28f) 10 As a consequence, Basel III has revised (49) for loans to …nancial obligors as follows
= 0:15 (1 exp ( 50 (def ault))) + 0:3 exp ( 50 (def ault)) so that (50) takes on values between 0:15 and 0:3.
Additivity of bucket VaRs
Finally, the Basel accord stipulates that the absolute VaR of the bank portfolio, which aggregates over all bucket portfolios within the bank, is additive in the absolute VaRs of the bank's bucket portfolios. More precisely, suppose that there are k = 1; :::; m di¤erent large bucket portfolios within a bank with corresponding percentage V aR q (X k ) and absolute portfolio values EAD k . The bank's percentage portfolio pro…t is then de…ned as
The Basel accord, implicitly, assumes that
whereby the second line follows from the positive homogeneity of the VaR criterion. If and only if additivity (52) holds, then the percentage capital charge V aR q (X k ) at con…dence level 1 q for every bucket portfolio k ensures that the aggregate capital
EAD k covers the aggregate bank portfolio P m k=1 EAD k at exactly the 1 q con…dence level.
It is well known in the literature that the VaR criterion is, in general, not additive.
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Even worse from a regulatory perspective, the VaR criterion is not subadditive in the sense that we always have
Consequently, there exist perceivable bucket portfolio pro…t distributions such that (54) is violated to the e¤ect that the percentage capital charges V aR q (X k ), which cover every bucket portfolio at a con…dence level 1 q, are not su¢ cient to cover the bank's overall portfolio at the 1 q con…dence level.
MINIMAL CONFIDENCE LEVELS OF BASEL REG-ULATION
Regardless of the strong assumptions underlying the Basel VaR approach, let us suppose that it is su¢ ciently close to the true VaR of a bank portfolio (1) . Let us also assume that the bank's internal rating truthfully comes up with good estimates for (def ault) and LGD for each bucket portfolio. Then the regulator is in the convenient position to enforce any desired con…dence level 1 q on the bank by requiring the capital charge (2) for every individual bank loan. This section critically investigates the actual Basel approach towards regulatory capital.
Regulatory capital
The BCBS states:
"The con…dence level is …xed at 99:9%, i.e. an institution is expected to su¤er losses that exceed its level of tier 1 and tier 2 capital on average once in a thousand years."(BCBS 2005, p.11)
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To cover for losses at the 99:9% con…dence level under the Basel VaR approach, the bank would have to cover every single loan by the following capital charge in percent of the loan's EAD V aR 0:001 (X) (55)
LGD with ( (def ault)) given by (49) (or by (50) for loans to …nancial obligors). Figure 2 shows the required capital charge as a function of the obligors'probability of default for LGD = 1 (for LGD = x just multiply the capital charges by x). Not surprisingly, the high con…dence level of 99:9% corresponds to high capital charges. This might be one of the reasons that the actual Basel capital requirement had not been de…ned as V aR 0:001 (X) but rather as
LGD. Figure 3 shows that the Basel regulatory capital K Basel strictly increases in the probability of default until it reaches a maximum at (def ault) ' 0:30976. For higher default probabilities the required capital charge strictly decreases to zero.
Expected versus unexpected losses
Observe that we can equivalently write (56) as
where the expected loss (=EL) of the Vasicek model is given as (def ault) LGD because of
That is, (def ault)
LGD is the average loss with respect to all possible realizations of the systemic factor Y . According to the Basel accord, the unexpected losses (=UL) are de…ned as the di¤erence between V aR 0:001 (X) and the expected losses so that the According to this concept, capital would only be needed for absorbing Unexpected Losses. Nevertheless, it has to be made sure that banks do indeed build enough provisions against EL. Up to the Third Consultative Paper of the Basel Committee, banks had thus been required to include EL in the risk weighted assets as well. Provisions set aside for credit losses could be counted against the EL portion of the risk weighted assets -as such only reducing the risk weighted assets by the amount of provisions actually built.
[:::] In the end, it was decided to follow the UL concept and to require banks to hold capital against UL only. However, in order to preserve a prudent level of overall funds, banks have to demonstrate that they build adequate provisions against EL."(BCBS 2005, p. 7)
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Whereas the BCBS is clear about the regulatory capital requirement against unexpected losses, its dealing with expected losses is rather vague. To see how banks actually "demonstrate that they build adequate provisions against EL"consider, for instance, the following statement from the 2011 Risk and capital management report of the Standard Bank Group: "Banks compare the IRB measurement of expected losses with the total amount of impairments that they have recognised in terms of IFRS [=Inter-national Financial Reporting Standards, the author], including both portfolio and speci…c impairments. For any individual bank, this comparison produces a shortfall if the expected loss amount exceeds total impairments, or an excess if total impairments exceed the expected loss amount.
Shortfall amounts, if any, are deducted from capital in the ratio of 50% from tier I capital and 50% from tier II capital."(p. 11)
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Under the assumptions of the Basel VaR approach, it is imperative that every single loan is covered by a capital charge that takes future expected plus unexpected losses of this speci…c loan into account. However, IFRS impairments are triggered by some credit event, i.e., when a loan turns unhealthy. The practice of the Standard Bank Group to o¤set IFRS impairments against expected losses of the Vasicek model therefore amounts to o¤setting realized losses of previous loans against future average losses of current loans. As a consequence, these currently healthy loans will not be fully covered against their expected losses whenever impairments re ‡ecting losses on previous loans are deduced from the capital charge for these current loans. The Standard Bank Group would thus hold the maximal capital amount V aR 0:001 (X) only if there were no previous impairments whereas it would only hold the minimal capital amount K Basel if these impairments exceeded the expected losses.
Conceptually an inconsistency has crept into the practice of the Basel regulation because the deduction of IFRS impairments from the capital base is altogether di¤erent from making provisions against expected losses in one year's time as required by the Vasicek model. This inconsistency between the Vasicek model and the actual Basel regulation points to a dangerous dynamic: If a Basel-regulated bank had su¤ered through a bad year resulting in substantial impairments, then its capital coverage for next year losses will be closer to K Basel than to V aR 0:001 (X). That is, banks that were previously a¤ected by substantial write-o¤s of unhealthy loans will-in perfect accordance with the practice of Basel regulation-only hold capital against unexpected but not against expected losses.
Minimal con…dence levels
Because of the inconsistency in the Basel regulation's dealing with expected losses, the capital of a Basel-regulated bank will be somewhere in the interval (3). As our main contribution we calculate the con…dence levels at which a Basel-regulated bank absorbs losses when it only holds the minimal capital (56). Formally, the minimal con…dence level, denoted 1 q , is determined by the equation
which is, under the Basel VaR approach, equivalent to
I present numerical values for q in the Appendix for default probabilities between 0:01 and 0:5.
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Recall that q stands for the probability that the bank will have failed after one year because more obligors default than it was covered for by the regulatory capital K Basel . Observe that q is a function in (def ault) but not in LGD. Not surprisingly, q turns out to be a strictly increasing function in the obligor's default probability. In other words: The minimal con…dence level 1 q is a strictly decreasing function in the obligor's default probability. In contrast to the o¢ cial 99:9% con…dence level of Basel regulation, which is …xed for all probabilities of obligors'default, the minimal con…dence levels which result when a bank only holds K Basel as capital are highly sensible to the obligors' probability of default. For moderate values of (def ault), q is strictly convex; that is, the gap between q and the o¢ cial Basel value of q = 0:001 increases in an accelerated way on the interval [0:01; 0:3]. For very small values of (def ault) the minimal con…dence level 1 q stays close to the o¢ cial con…dence level 1 q = 0:999. However, at (def ault) = 0:1 the probability q of a bank failure after one year is already about nine times higher than the 0:001 probability stipulated by the Basel regulation. At (def ault) = 0:26 the probability of a bank failure is at 0:1 and at (def ault) = 0:315 it is already at 0:2. Finally, at the high default probability (def ault) = 0:5 the probability of a bank failure is at 0:81!
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A full-blown economic model of optimal banking regulation would have to model some trade-o¤ between the perceived economic costs of a bank failure, on the one hand, and the bene…ts of a bank's lending to risky obligors, on the other hand. 15 18 The scope of the present paper has been considerably narrower. First, I exclusively describe the risk of a bank's failure in terms of credit risk whereby I neglect any further aspects of operational and market risks. Second, I have accepted the o¢ cial con…dence level of 99:9% as the regulator's solution to the optimal trade-o¤ between bank failure and lending activity. In a next step, I have asked whether the Basel accord actually covers a bank at this 99:9% con…dence level under the assumption that the Basel VaR formula is a correct description of the bank's true VaR. At this point, I have identi…ed an inconsistency between the Basel VaR approach and the practice of Basel regulation concerning the capital coverage of expected losses. More speci…cally, I argue that the practice of treating impairments for unhealthy loans as provisions for future expected losses may result in a worst case scenario in which the bank's capital only covers against unexpected losses. In order to evaluate this worst case scenario of the …nancial stability of a Baselregulated banking system, I have calculated the minimal con…dence levels that correspond to the minimal regulatory capital required by the Basel accord. These minimal con…dence levels are strictly decreasing in the obligors'default probability so that the …nancial stability of a Basel-regulated banking system is likely to be more prone to bank failures than suggested by the o¢ cial con…dence level of 99:9%. This would be especially true for banks that hold rather risky loans in their portfolio and that were previously a¤ected by substantial write-o¤s of unhealthy loans. For these banks the probability of surviving for another year will be signi…cantly lower than 99:9% despite the fact that they hold capital in accordance with the practice of Basel regulation. Note that this paper's analysis therefore o¤ers a (partial) explanation for the empirical …ndings by Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 19 who argue that a bank's compliance with Basel regulation is not robustly associated with this bank's probability of survival.
